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Abstract 
This article is concerned with post-Marxism and materialism in the work of Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau 
and Chantal Mouffe. As ‘post-Marxists’ these writers use ‘material’ in a variety of ways, all of which 
indicate limits and constraints. The article focuses on one version of ‘materialism’ in this work, a version 
that is more implied than elaborated, in which ‘material’ is equivalent to institutionalized performativity 
or sedimented discourse: to ‘objective’ social structures and institutions. Post-Marxists often use ‘the 
social’ as equivalent to ‘material’ in this sense, to gesture towards the context in which politics succeeds or 
fails. I argue that the specificities of ‘the social’ cannot be theorized from within the terms of post-
Marxism itself and that Butler and Laclau acknowledge this limitation in their most recent work. I 
therefore conclude that post-Marxism needs a supplement that I call political sociology.  This is a 
dangerous supplement in the Derridean sense: a necessary addition that destabilizes the value post-
Marxism gives to the distinction between ‘social’ and ‘political’ in which the latter is the privileged term. 
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This paper addresses the topic of poststructuralist political theory and materialism through the work of 
Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. It is no doubt because all three identify as post-
Marxists (including Butler [2000a: 11], who is not commonly thought of as such), that, despite the 
contradictions and disagreements between these thinkers and across different texts, the question of the 
relationship between materialism and politics has run throughout the body of work they have produced. 
 
The terms ‘material’ and ‘political’ are themselves, of course, highly contested. As we shall see, ‘material’ is 
used in a variety of different ways in this work, though its meanings are not always clearly specified. There 
are at least four meanings that are clearly defined and elaborated. ‘Material’ is used as equivalent to 
‘economic’; as equivalent to ‘substance’; as opposed to ‘ideal’; and as praxis. There is a further sense of 
‘material’ that is more implied than elaborated in the work of Butler and of Laclau and Mouffe, as 
equivalent to ‘the social’ and opposed to ‘the political’. ‘The social’ is often used in this work to gesture 
towards the sense of ‘material’ that runs through all these different meanings: the idea of limit and 
constraint. In this article I will argue that the specificities of ‘the social’ cannot be theorized from within 
the terms of post-Marxism itself, which always already relies on an unspecified understanding of actually 
existing social structures and institutions, and that post-Marxism therefore needs a supplement that I call 
political sociology. The necessary supplement to post-Marxism should be compatible with the 
understanding of ‘the political’ as constitutive that has been argued for so persuasively in this work. As 
distinct from ‘politics’, which involves the contestation of hegemonic subordination, ‘the political’ is 
conceived of as ‘inherent in every human society and [as] determin[ing] our very ontological being’ 
(Mouffe, 1993: 3). A supplementary political sociology must go beyond the limits of post-Marxist political 
theory, however, to develop systematic analyses, based on empirically oriented ‘middle-range’ theory, of 
what is under-theorized in this body of work: it must offer empirically and conceptually revisable accounts 
of the structures and institutions that always risk limiting ‘politics’ in particular social formations. 
 
The ‘material’ of ‘the social’ is less excluded from theoretical consideration in post-Marxism than relied on 
and yet impossible to theorize from within the terms of post-Marxism itself. In this sense, political 
sociology is a dangerous supplement that marks the limits of post-Marxism as a political theory (Derrida, 
1974). ‘Adding’ political sociology to post-Marxism is not an innocent or simple addition; it is a necessary 
addition that destabilizes the very terms within which the distinction between ‘the social’ and ‘the 
political’ is drawn. 
Judith Butler: materialization and its limits 
There are two quite different, and contradictory, versions of materialism in Judith Butler’s work. 
Surprisingly, on occasion, Butler simply treats ‘material’ as equivalent to ‘economic’. In an article 
published in New Left Review in 1998, ‘Merely Cultural’, Butler opposes her views to those of unnamed 
commentators on the left who, she says, claim that the politics of social movements is largely irrelevant or 
even pernicious because of its divisive effects. She takes the lesbian and gay movement as the critical case 
since, she says, queer politics is seen as the most cultural and the least relevant in that it is the furthest 
from any involvement in socio-economic struggles. Butler argues that, on the contrary, the concerns of the 
queer movement are absolutely central to any socialist strategy because the production of heterosexuality 
is essential to the reproduction of capitalism. Butler uses ‘material’ as interchangeable with ‘political 
economy’ in this case, then, and her article is studded with quotes from the works of Marx and Engels to 
this effect (e.g. Butler, 1998: 39). In fact, she restates what she takes to be the most useful insights of 
Marxist feminists of the 1970s to make her argument that there is no absolute, ontological distinction 
between cultural and economic concerns. She describes how Marxist feminists analysed the family as the 
site of reproduction of heterosexual persons as a condition of the reproduction of the capitalist mode of 
production itself: production requires reproduction. She then extends the analysis to encompass the 
production of homosexuality as an ‘abject’, delegitimated identity that provides a condition of the 
production of heterosexuality as normal and normative. The production of sexuality is not simply cultural, 
it is functional to the capitalist economy (Butler, 1998). The production of sexuality is, therefore, material 
in this sense. 
 
Butler’s argument is surprising in many respects, not least because in restating functionalist Marxism, she 
is restating a position that for many provoked a dissatisfaction that was the starting-point of post-
Marxism (Barrett, 1980, 1991). Butler’s discussion of the issues is, in fact, extremely underdeveloped (see 
Fraser, 1998).  Her use of Marxist functionalism is incompatible with the main body of her own work and 
specifically with the second conception of ‘material’ to which she is committed.  
 
In Bodies That Matter Butler develops quite a different understanding of materiality. She sees it as a 
process taking place in time, rather than as a self-subsisting substance, so that she explicitly discusses 
materialization rather than ‘material’ as such. Matter is not to be seen, she argues, as ‘site or surface, but 
as a process of materialization that stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity and 
surface we call matter’ (1993: 9; original emphases). She is concerned with the materiality of sexed 
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bodies in this work, arguing that sex is produced through regulatory norms that delegitimate certain 
bodies and possibilities of identification while fixing others as ‘natural’. She sees materialization as 
produced in what she calls performativity, practices involving words and acts that produce effects or a 
transformation in the situation in which they are enacted. She gives medical norms as an example, 
arguing that the ‘girling’ of an infant by naming it ‘she’ rather than ‘it’ brings the human subject into the 
domain of language, kinship and other authorities, which work to reinforce or contest this naturalized 
effect (1993: 7–8). 
 
Sex is material, Butler suggests, in that although it is socially constructed it is not therefore a ‘fiction’; it is 
rather a necessity within which we live, ‘without which life itself would be unthinkable’ (1993: 6). 
Nevertheless, she is at least as concerned with the subversion of this ‘necessity’ as with its consolidation. 
For Butler, performativity involves the institution of regulatory norms through their repetition, and this 
repetition is at the same time the condition of possibility of their subversion. Here she follows Jacques 
Derrida’s discussion of John Austin’s ideas in ‘Signature, Event, Context’, though, as we shall see, Butler 
also marks a difference between her theory of performativity and Derrida’s (Derrida, 1988). She argues 
that performativity involves citation: the authority with which a performance is endowed depends neither 
on the intention of the performer nor on the context in which it is enacted, but on the forceful conventions 
it mobilizes and at the same time conceals through repetition. Every citation is unstable: dependent on 
the exclusions performatives have executed in the past and, because it must be repeated in order to be 
effective, open to re-citation in novel ways that may subvert the regulatory norms it produces. To return to 
Butler’s example of ‘girling’, she argues that a ‘girl’ is compelled to cite the norm in order to continue to 
qualify as a viable human subject, to enact a corporeal femininity that can never be achieved once and for 
all. There is always, therefore, the possibility of subverting the performance or of resignifying it in 
radically new ways.  
 
This possibility is, for Butler, the site of politics. It is the possibility of creating new conventions and of 
pluralizing legitimate identities. In her first book on this question, Gender Trouble (1990), Butler focussed 
on parody as a way of subverting gendered performances, speculating that drag may show up the 
naturalized unity between sex, gender and sexuality constructed in conventional performances of ‘women’ 
(or, less commonly, ‘men’). Later, in Bodies That Matter (1993), in response to those who mistakenly 
concluded from the earlier work that she saw sex as voluntary, an appearance we put on with our clothes, 
she insisted that gender is not so easily subverted. Drawing on the conventions of gendered embodiment, 
drag may involve denaturalization or reidealization. As a performance of excessive theatricality, drag is 
political insofar as it is ‘the site of a certain ambivalence’; the agents of queer politics are both implicated 
in and opposed to the regimes of power within which they are constituted (1993: 125).1 As we shall see, it 
is this issue of the success or failure of performative politics that leads Butler towards Laclau’s and 
Mouffe’s theory of hegemony as a way to contextualize constraints and limits on its possibilities in 
concrete social contexts. 
 
Butler’s second conception of ‘material’ may also be seen in terms of the Marxist tradition, as similar to 
Marx’s idea of praxis. Indeed, Butler herself notes this, quoting Marx’s first thesis on Feuerbach to the 
effect that materialism must be seen as ‘sensuous, human activity’, the ongoing transformation of matter 
in social practices (1993: 31 and n.). It is, however, quite at odds with the functionalism she espouses in 
the first conception of ‘material’ as ‘economic’.2 In fact, if matter is conceived of as ‘materialization’ 
through performativity, as a process of transformation over time, the very idea of ‘the capitalist economy’ 
is a reification of a set of complex and always unstable practices (Gibson-Graham, 1996).  
 
Marxist functionalism is, then, incompatible with Butler’s theory of performativity. However, it is clear 
that the way in which Butler uses it to supplement her theorization of politics is indicative of a lack in the 
theory of performativity itself. Butler has, in fact, articulated this need by distancing her theorization of 
performativity from that of Derrida. She argues that his conception of performativity is inadequate 
because it is too formal and lacks an understanding of power. For Derrida, ‘iterability’ or citation involves 
the repetition of signs that break with previous contexts. Iterability is the structural characteristic of every 
mark; a sign must always break with previous contexts in order to function as such and it is, therefore, 
susceptible to failure. In Butler’s terms, it is open to subversion and resignification. Butler argues that 
Derrida’s account is inadequate because it is necessary to consider the social context within which signs 
actually operate in order to understand how they work: why is it that some break with previous contexts 
more easily than others? And why do some carry more force and efficacity than others? She argues that 
Derrida’s account of performativity must be supplemented with a theory of the ‘social iterability’ of 
performances as implicated in relations of power (1997b: 152).  
 
In this discussion of Derrida’s theory of performativity, Butler implies that her own theory does not suffer 
from such deficiencies. However, this is far from evident. Butler apparently takes it that because she has 
elaborated a theory of performativity as cultural, as embodied and embedded in social practices that are 
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implicated in power relations, rather than as textual, it is not susceptible to the same kinds of criticisms. 
However, demonstrating awareness that performativity is always caught within the workings of power is 
not the same as theorizing how this happens to a greater or lesser extent in different contexts. It falls far 
short of the theory of social context that Butler implies is required by the theory of performativity. If, as 
Butler argues, the political possibilities of subversion formally inherent in every performance can only 
actually be realized under certain social conditions – when signs are able to break with previous contexts 
and contribute to the production of a new situation – what is needed is an understanding of those 
conditions under which such a break is likely to take place and of those that hinder the creation of 
‘something new’. In the terms I am using here, Butler’s theory of politics as performativity requires a 
political sociology: generalizations concerning relatively enduring social institutions and structures that 
influence which performances are likely to succeed.3 
 
Although she has subsequently been more critical of Laclau’s work (Butler, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c), Butler 
apparently saw the theory of hegemony he developed with Mouffe in the 1980s as the theory of ‘social 
iterability’ she identified as necessary for her understanding of politics as performative (Butler and 
Laclau, 1997). In other words, Butler took the theory of hegemony to provide a political sociology as a 
supplement to the theory of performativity. 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe: material discourse 
As post-Marxists Laclau and Mouffe clearly position themselves in the materialist tradition, opposed to 
idealism. In accordance with their iconoclastic reading of that tradition, however, they rework this 
opposition in an original way. They argue that the most important understanding of materialism does not 
involve claims about the existence and importance of reality external to thought; it is rather the 
‘affirmation . . . of the ultimate irreducibility of the real to the concept’ (1990: 107). Where idealists like 
Hegel and Plato see the real as essentially rational thought, materialists should understand it as exceeding 
all determinate form and therefore any possible apprehension in thought. Drawing on the non-referential 
linguistics of Saussure and, like Butler, on the work of Derrida, Laclau and Mouffe argue that a genuinely 
materialist political theory sees all supposedly self-identical objects as constituted only in unstable 
relation to others and therefore as fundamentally precarious and incomplete. This instability is crucial to 
Laclau’s and Mouffe’s political theory because it provides the conditions for the articulation of 
differentiated identities into new relations that can rework and oppose existing relations of domination. It 
is in this sense that ‘the political’ is ontological: it determines who we are and what is possible out of 
antagonisms that structure the very limits of the symbolic. 
 
There is another sense of ‘material’ that is implicit in Laclau’s and Mouffe’s work, however, that they 
address only summarily: the sense in which ‘actually existing’ social structures and institutions constrain 
political possibilities. This is the sense of ‘material’ that is so important to the way in which Butler has 
sought to use their work. Laclau and Mouffe deal with this sense of ‘material’ under the concepts of 
‘discourse’ and ‘hegemony’. 
 
Laclau and Mouffe are clear that discourse is not to be seen as simply linguistic. It combines linguistic and 
extra-linguistic dimensions in social practices. ‘Discourse’ involves the use of a word or phrase as an act 
that situates its meaning in a social context and in relation to other terms (1985: 100–3). In fact, although 
Butler’s theory of performativity has been developed using other resources, it is clear that it has much in 
common with this understanding of discourse: both performativity and discourse enact, and so bring 
about, the states of affairs that are presumed to exist prior to that enactment. 
 
The theory of hegemony builds on this understanding of discourse. There are various different senses of 
‘hegemony’ in Laclau’s and Mouffe’s work (Howarth, 2000: 109–11). Typically, ‘hegemony’ as developed 
from Gramsci’s (1971) writings is taken to indicate the way in which social relations are formed through 
consent rather than imposed. One of the most obvious ways to understand how a theory of hegemony is 
developed by Laclau and Mouffe, and that which best suits Butler’s use of it, is that it offers tools for 
analysis of the way in which social forms are politically constituted through the articulation of unstable 
signifiers in concrete practices. According to this understanding, although the social field should not be 
seen as made up of determinate institutions and structures with clear boundaries, it is not for that reason 
entirely chaotic and fluid. Hegemony is (only ever partially) achieved insofar as it effectively constructs 
‘horizons of intelligibility’ that ‘delineate what is possible, what can be said and done, what positions may 
legitimately be taken, what actions may be engaged in, and so forth’ (Norval, quoted in Smith, 1998: 64). 
According to the different senses of ‘material’ I have identified in this work, then, the material 
indeterminacy of social forms enables the hegemonizing of meaning, fixing it in relatively stable, material 
social formations that limit actual political possibilities in specific ways. 
 
Laclau’s and Mouffe’s understanding of politics is certainly in sympathy with that of Butler if hegemony is 
understood in this way. For them a hegemonic ‘horizon of intelligibility’ is unstable and always, therefore,  
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open to rearticulation in new forms. According to Laclau and Mouffe (1985), discursive formations are 
always realized through constitutive antagonism such that the unity constructed between different 
elements can never be finally established as necessary and complete. The unity of political signifiers is 
‘naturalized’ where a hegemonic formation is institutionalized, but the constitutive undecidability of their 
articulation means that re-signification is always a possibility. For Laclau and Mouffe, as for Butler, this 
re-signification is the work of politics. The concretization of hegemonic articulations involves power that 
works to exclude alternative frameworks. Politics is the realization, in the first instance, of the possibility 
of other possibilities, and then, potentially, of radically different alternatives in a counter-hegemonic 
discourse. 
 
Furthermore, Laclau and Butler also have compatible understandings of ‘the social’. As we have seen, in 
Butler’s call for a theory of ‘social iterability’, ‘social’ stands in for the relative fixity of regulatory norms 
and their resistance to subversion in particular contexts. Similarly, Laclau distinguishes between ‘the 
social’ and ‘the political’ (1990: 33–6). ‘The social’ is the routinization or sedimentation of discourse and 
the construction of ‘objective’ institutions and structures. ‘The political’, on the other hand, is the 
reactivation or rediscovery of the fact that what are taken to be ‘objective’ social forms are actually nothing 
more than contingent constructions that may be reconfigured in new ways. 
 
However, despite the compatibility of their approaches in these respects, it is far from clear that Laclau’s 
and Mouffe’s theory of hegemony provides the tools of a political sociology to complement Butler’s theory 
of performativity. The convergence between Laclau’s and Mouffe’s theory of hegemony and Butler’s 
theory of performativity has been emphasized in Anna Marie Smith’s (1998) interpretation of their work 
which is also an attempt to make its sociological implications more apparent. Smith’s interpretation has 
been made partly in response to critics who argue that Laclau’s and Mouffe’s radical constructivism is 
inadequate to theorizing the social and historical conditions in which structures and identities are actually 
formed. She sets out to make explicit the theory of structures and institutions she sees as implied in the 
work of Laclau and Mouffe as a response to criticisms that they overemphasize contingency at the expense 
of the relative fixity of historical formations.  
 
Smith’s sociological interpretation is, however, rather creative with respect to Laclau’s and Mouffe’s 
theory of hegemony. Laclau and Mouffe do use terms from sociological theory, but their theory of 
hegemony has been developed as a meta-theory, at a high level of abstraction, and what the content of 
those terms might be is unclear. The difficulty of reconciling metatheory with a political sociology 
concerned with more concrete structures and institutions runs through Smith’s interpretation. As she 
points out, Laclau’s and Mouffe’s theory of hegemony should not be seen as prescriptive of any particular 
form of institutional analysis. The advantage of the theory of hegemony is precisely that it sensitizes us to 
the particularities of identity formation and complex structural positionings. The anti-essentialist project 
of the theory of hegemony dictates that there is no a priori necessity for any particular combination of 
social elements. On this basis she suggests that any general account of social institutions must be built 
‘from the bottom up’, study by study, comparing similarities and differences across cases (Smith, 1998: 
159–60). Although this is in some ways an attractive solution to the problem of how to develop a political 
sociology that would remain sensitive to contextual specificities and multiple subjectivities, it is difficult to 
see how it might work in practice. The possibility of realizing such a project seems to depend on a further 
claim made by Smith, that the theory of hegemony can be used to detect structures and institutions that 
create limits for political practice (1998: 106). It seems to me that there are certain aspects of Laclau’s and 
Mouffe’s theory of hegemony that make this impossible. 
 
Laclau’s and Mouffe’s theory of hegemony is governed by an tendency towards deconstruction that makes 
it difficult to use as an instrument for theoretical reconstruction. This is evident, for example, in their 
deconstruction of the Marxist tradition. Their aim is certainly not to jettison Marxism in its entirety but 
rather to retain transformed, ‘de-essentialized’ concepts that they take to be of continuing value (Laclau, 
1990: 178–9). Indeed, they do retain certain Marxist terms: ‘hegemony’, of course, but also ‘capitalism’ 
and even, on occasion, ‘the State’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). However, the status of these terms as 
sociological theory, that is, in relation to historically specific institutions and structures, is unclear. This is 
because Laclau’s and Mouffe’s deconstruction of Marxist sociology is governed by more abstract 
philosophical, or more accurately anti-philosophical, principles. In an article called ‘The Impossibility of 
Society’, Laclau makes a clear statement of the perspective that guides their deconstruction of Marxism. 
As we have seen, it is a precept of Laclau’s and Mouffe’s materialism that any form of objectivity is 
impossible, because social forms are never fully present to themselves. Any totality is always constructed 
in relation to an excess of meaning that surrounds it. This means that it is never fully intelligible as an 
object of knowledge, never fully itself to be described and defined, but always in some respect 
indeterminate (Laclau, 1990: 89–92). 
 
However, while this deconstructive impetus is clearly driven by the definition of materialism that Laclau 
and Mouffe oppose to idealism, it also makes it impossible to theorize the other sense of ‘material’ to 
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which they allude in the theory of hegemony – the way in which social forms are instituted in hegemonic 
discourse. Their understanding of objectivity as always constituted through negativity makes it difficult to 
see the validity of any sociological theory that tries to identify or establish a knowledge of social forms 
since they are, by definition, unknowable.4 The deconstructive tendency of Laclau’s and Mouffe’s theory 
militates against theory-building, which requires the fixing and freezing of a complex and dynamic social 
process, a naming that recalls the metaphysics of presence against which Derridean deconstruction works. 
Guided by this deconstructive impetus, their approach suggests that what is important is to turn one’s 
attention towards the falsely objectifying claims of sociological theory rather than towards the 
indeterminate objects of social life. It is not coincidental, then, that Laclau’s and Mouffe’s reconstruction 
of the Marxist tradition has been so much less developed than their deconstruction. The tendency towards 
deconstruction at a meta-theoretical level by no means encourages reconstruction at the less abstract level 
of sociological theory. 
 
It is not, of course the case that all uses of the theory of hegemony must necessarily neglect theory-
building simply because Laclau’s and Mouffe’s own work focuses less on the reconstruction of sociological 
theory than on its deconstruction. It is rather that the theory of hegemony does not itself provide the tools 
with which to construct such theory. Developed out of the Marxist tradition, it may now be used to 
deconstruct any theory that posits necessary, a priori social relations and objective structures. In principle 
it is then possible, in addition to deconstructing sociological theory, to reconstruct its objects using such 
concepts as ‘hegemony’, ‘articulation’ and ‘antagonism’ to build up an understanding of a particular social 
configuration. It is in this way that Smith’s proposed methodology for theory-building may be understood. 
She sees generalizations as possible and worthwhile only if they are made on the basis of comparing 
similarities and differences across concrete analyses of social formations; otherwise, they go beyond the 
configurations to which they are appropriate, universalizing the specific and contingent and obscuring 
detailed differences and important exceptions (1998: 159–60; see also Fraser and Nicholson, 1990). 
However, Laclau’s and Mouffe’s concepts cannot be used to identify the content of relevant 
generalizations concerning similarities and differences: though derived from a particular tradition of 
thought, they are conceived of as universal tools of analysis (Laclau, 2000c: 200). As Laclau himself 
argues, ‘Any social theory worth the name tries to isolate forms of structural determination which are 
context-specific in their variation and relative weight, but tries also . . . to build its concepts in such a way 
that they make social, and historical, comparisons possible’ (ibid.: 189). But insofar as structures named 
as ‘capitalism’ or ‘the State’ are context-specific, the quasi-universal, and therefore relatively ‘empty’, tools 
of discourse analysis have nothing to contribute to a discussion about how and why we might delineate 
them in one way rather than another in a particular historic and geographic social formation. The only 
way Laclau’s and Mouffe’s post-Marxism may be used to analyse particular social formations is by 
employing middle-range sociological theories alongside it, to identify institutions and structures that 
cannot be ‘detected’ using discourse analysis.5 
 
Laclau’s and Mouffe’s theory of hegemony is not, then, a political sociology of the kind that I have argued 
Butler has identified as necessary to supplement her theory of politics as performativity. Nor is it possible 
to build a sociological theory using concepts developed from within its terms, as Smith has proposed – at 
least, not without supplementing it with sociological theory imported from elsewhere. In fact, Laclau does 
import sociological theory into his work on occasion, citing Lash’s and Urry’s (1987) analysis of 
disorganized capitalism, for example, as useful for understanding contemporary social forms within which 
new spaces of political struggle should be identified (Laclau, 1990: 58–9). He does not, however, discuss 
the implications of this sociological theory for his analysis of politics, nor elaborate on its relation to the 
terms of post-Marxism. It is a necessary addition that goes unacknowledged in Laclau’s work: an addition 
that should not be necessary. Post-Marxism as I have analysed it here in the work of Butler and of Laclau 
and Mouffe productively develops the political implications of Derridean deconstruction.6 However, the 
deconstructive understanding of the precarious instability of any identity that is so productive for this 
work also makes it impossible to develop concepts from within its own terms to deal with the relative 
fixity of ‘the social’ towards which post-Marxists gesture. The post-Marxist theory of hegemony has little 
to offer towards a materialist understanding of the limits of politics. 
Laclau: political logics and political sociology  
In a number of recent statements, Laclau has sought to distinguish post-Marxism from sociology. In a 
foreword to a collection of studies from the Essex programme in discourse analysis, inspired by 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Laclau (2000a: x–xi) states that he sees this work as setting out the 
conditions for any possible sociological analysis, rather than as elaborating a sociological analysis as such. 
Again, in a footnote specifically directed against Smith’s attempt to develop a sociological theory from this 
work, he states that the research programme to which he subscribes is concerned with ‘formal analysis 
and abstraction’ rather than with the ‘factual and journalistic accounts’ he associates with the empiricism 
of sociology (2000b: 86–7). Such comments may, of course, be read, not as against sociology as such, but 
rather as against inadequate sociology: which does not take into account the conditions of its own 
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possibility, or which relies on ‘facts’. However, the direction of Laclau’s own thinking suggests rather that 
he sees the theory of hegemony as offering tools for the analysis of ‘political logics’ that are apparently 
quite independent of social structures and institutions. In this respect Laclau’s conclusion is close to the 
position argued for in this paper: that the theory of hegemony does not, in fact, offer tools for the analysis 
of ‘the social’ at all. The question this raises, however, is the following: can such an analysis dispense with 
political sociology altogether? 
 
In a recent series of essays in which Laclau debates post-Marxism with Judith Butler and Slavoj Zižek 
(2000), he suggests that formal and abstract ‘political logics’ are the object of study of the theory of 
hegemony. ‘Political logics’ are ambiguously related to the constraints of actually existing structures and 
social institutions in this account and, as we shall see, insofar as what Laclau is formulating is a 
methodology, he actually gives a good deal of scope to political sociology. In some respects, however, he 
seems to see ‘political logics’ as analysable quite independently of social context. He differentiates his 
understanding of hegemony from that of Gramsci, for example, in relation to Gramsci’s own rather 
contradictory distinction between state and civil society. Laclau (2000b: 50) suggests that, according to 
Gramsci’s own understanding, hegemonic ‘collective will’ does not respect this distinction in social reality 
so that what is to be analysed is ‘a horizon of intelligibility of the social which is grounded not in 
topographies but in logics’. The point here is that the concrete, actually existing structures and 
institutions with which sociologists might be concerned are of secondary importance to the ‘logic’ of 
hegemony that is to be analysed by the post-Marxist political theorist. 
 
The fact that Laclau continues to see ‘politics’ as ‘constitutive of the social’ does not compromise the 
independent relation between the two that is so important to the sphere of analysis he is carving out for 
the theory of hegemony. He has identified two political logics that are ‘constitutive of the social’: the first 
is that of ‘difference’ which separates out particular social identities; the second is that of ‘equivalence’ in 
which differentiated identities are seen as substitutable in relation to an ‘empty universal’ (2000c: 193–
4). It is the latter that is particularly important to Laclau since he argues that a genuine politics of the left, 
which could compete with the current neo-liberal consenus, is only possible in relation to such a universal 
(2000d: 306). Laclau presumably sees this logic as ‘constitutive of the social’ when it is successful; that is, 
when it becomes sedimented in new social structures and institutions. In this respect, ‘the social’ is not 
seen as important to political analysis as such; it is just an effect of politics.  
 
However, questions of the relation between ‘the social’ and ‘political logics’ also arise prior to the effect of 
the political on the social – in two main ways. First, Laclau argues that although political logics always 
take one of these two forms, the possibility that either of them will actually arise in any particular case is 
not determined by its formal characteristics. Secondly, the concrete content of either of these forms, the 
identities that are articulated as different or as equivalent, is ‘contextually dependent’ (2000c: 192). 
According to this account, far from being independent of ‘the social’, in every respect except their formal 
characteristics political logics are conditioned by social context. 
 
From the point of view of the argument I am developing here, this understanding of politics as 
conditioned by ‘the social’ is very close to that of Butler. While ‘politics’ involves radical change and new 
possibilities, ‘the social’ is limit and constraint, involving the possibility that new possibilities will not 
actually be realized. As we have seen, this is the domain for which Butler has identified what I am calling 
political sociology as necessary, to theorize the actually existing structures and institutions within which 
politics takes place. Insofar as Laclau’s thinking on ‘political logics’ is methodological (and were we 
unaware of the disdain in which he holds sociology), it would seem from this last point that what he is 
doing here is demarcating precisely the point at which the theory of hegemony ‘runs out’ and political 
sociology should take over political analysis. 
 
However, it is not clear that such a political sociology will be as limited as Laclau’s formulations suggest. 
Even if social space must always be divided according to the two logics he has identified – a suggestion 
that seems somewhat simplistic – the analysis of their formal qualities apart from the study of the context 
of their emergence and content is a highly circumscribed exercise. In fact, Laclau’s demarcation between 
the domains of the theory of hegemony and that of political sociology would seem to give to the latter a 
good deal more to do than to the former. 
 
Let us take the study of social movements as an example. This is far from a random example in that Butler 
and Laclau and Mouffe frequently refer to social movements, taking them to be the principal agents of 
radical politics today. There is indeed a large sociological literature on social movements, concerned with 
the conditions of their emergence, the constraints under which they organize and communicate, their 
strategies and possibilities of success. For example, there is the ‘political process’ school of social 
movement theory that looks at their emergence and development in relation to ‘political opportunity 
structures’. The understanding that has been developed in these studies is that social movements are 
encouraged or discouraged by changes in state tolerance, reformism or repression (Tarrow, 1998: 18–19). 
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This approach is not necessarily incompatible with that of post-Marxism. It is possible to see changes in 
political opportunity structures in terms of Laclau’s ‘political logics’: in some cases elements of the state 
elite may be articulated in ‘political logics’ of equivalence prior to the emergence of mass mobilization. 
However, what is particularly important from the ‘political process’ perspective is that it is changes in the 
state as an institution that make mobilization likely. The state is seen as particularly important in this 
respect because of its monopolization of force and because claims made by social movements are so often 
addressed to the nation-state as the power-holder in society. The most dramatic example of a successful 
political transformation in recent times is the ‘Velvet Revolution’ that swept Eastern Europe at the end of 
the 1980s: although it was undoubtedly protest movements in civil society that brought down the 
totalitarian regimes of the Soviet bloc, this would not have been possible if the government of the USSR 
had not withdrawn the military support that would otherwise have crushed them. In this case, although 
the ‘political process’ model of social movements and the theory of hegemony may take 
the same object of study, and although they need not be seen as incommensurable, the explanatory value 
of the ‘political process’ model exceeds that of the theory of hegemony. It enables us to see how this 
particular form of collective action was possible at this time and how it was successful in achieving its 
aims. 
 
This example should not be taken to mean that political analysis must always be concerned with the state 
as the political institution. One of the most important gains of post-Marxism is the shift away from seeing 
politics as taking place only at this level.7 What post-Marxism offers in this respect is a way of 
understanding politics as central to social life rather than as a localized activity with little or no 
implication for how we think about social change in general. A political sociology that supplements post-
Marxism must, therefore, also complement it, taking up the challenge to rethink its own categories, 
narrowly focused as it has been on activities directed towards state power. 
 
There is, in fact, interesting work already being done along these lines, particularly that concerned with 
the topics of globalization, global governance and the power and status of the nation-state and on the 
conditions of emergence of social movements and their radical or reformist possibilities (Nash, 2000; 
Nash and Scott, 2001). Furthermore, sociology ‘after the cultural turn’ (Nash, 2001) is resistant to 
positivism and functionalism that would prioritize the universality of social laws over attention to the 
specificity of social context, and has much in common with post-Marxism; unsurprisingly given that both 
bodies of work have been directly and indirectly influenced by poststructuralism. The best of this work is 
methodologically rigorous, using comparative analysis and the development of ideal types to organize 
empirical research and produce generalizations that are theoretically informed but sensitive to similarities 
and differences across contexts. While post-Marxism apparently gives rise to an anti-essentialist purity 
that deconstructs but can not construct accounts of ‘the social’, or that leads to logical formalism, in 
Laclau’s view, or to a counsel of perfection that is impossible to fulfil, in Smith’s inductivist interpretation 
of its methodological requirements, contemporary political sociology, equally concerned not to impose 
dogmatic concepts on complex and fluid reality, makes use of flawed and revisable models that are to be 
judged both in terms of the logical clarity of the concepts used and in terms of their adequacy to the 
empirical. There is, then, much work in contemporary political sociology that could supplement post-
Marxist political theory, providing the analyses of ‘actually existing’ politics on which post-Marxism more 
or less implicitly relies. 
Political sociology: a dangerous supplement 
Because post-Marxism cannot develop an adequate analysis of ‘the social’ from within its own terms, it 
needs political sociology as a supplement. The necessary supplement of political sociology is not, however, 
an innocent addition: it does not leave post-Marxism itself unaltered. The most obvious implication of 
this supplementary relationship concerns the scope of post-Marxism. If the processes by which political 
performances succeed in that they create genuinely new practices or become institutionalized in new 
hegemonic forms are relatively rare, then a political sociology that supplements post-Marxism will be 
predominantly concerned with the failure of political possibilities, with material constraints on realizing 
radical change. And insofar as post-Marxist political theory is concerned above all with those rare 
moments, it will be of little use to most political analysis. In this case, the tools of post-Marxism become 
secondary to those developed by political sociologists to study political possibilities in concrete social 
contexts. A dangerous supplement indeed, which supplements and supplants that which should not need 
to be supplemented at all.  
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Notes 
1 The site of cultural politics is also, for Butler, the site of agency. She argues that performativity is not to be 
understood as the act by which a subject brings into being what he or she names. It is rather that the subject herself or 
himself is brought into being as a willing, gendered, human being in performativity. At the same time, because 
regulatory norms require repetition, it is never enough simply to obey them; the subject is never outside gendered 
constructions, but nor is he or she completely within them. The necessity for repetition, for the continual reenactment 
of norms, is also the condition of agency. In Butler’s words (1993: 220): ‘[A]gency is the hiatus in iterability, the 
compulsion to install an identity through repetition, which requires the very contingency, the undetermined interval, 
that identity insistently seeks to foreclose.’  
 
2 As Jorge Larrain notes, Marx’s idea of praxis is that consciousness is constitutive of material reality insofar as it 
depends on human practice. The alternative Marxist understanding of the relation between the material world and 
consciousness depends on what is called the ‘base–superstructure’ model in which ideas are seen as independent of, 
and ultimately determined by, economic relations (Larrain, 1986: 16–17). This is the model on which functionalism 
depends: the superstructural forms of capitalism, including the family, are determined by the exigencies of the 
capitalist economy. 
 
3 Butler (1997b) has addressed the question of the endurance of regulatory norms and the difficulty of destabilizing 
them in The Psychic Life of Power, focusing on the formation of the subject in relation to power. However successful 
this project may be, though, it clearly does not begin to deal with the question of material constraints that exist 
independently of subjectivity.  
 
4 It should perhaps be noted here that these claims concern only the objects of social theory. At the meta-theoretical 
level Laclau and Mouffe do make knowledge-claims: concerning the unknowability of social objects and also how an 
overdetermined social field is constructed.  
 
5 The question of historical specificity I am investigating here does not concern the limits of representation, which do 
not pose any greater problems for sociology than for any other systematic body of knowledge (see note 4). If anything 
it concerns the status of what Laclau calls ‘the example’ (Laclau, 2000c: 64). For an example to add nothing to 
content, as Laclau suggests, is to put ‘content’ on the side of concept as transhistorical as opposed to concept as 
historically specific, rather than to show how content is both universal and particular, which is what he wants to 
argue. When Laclau gives examples of particular political demands or mass mobilizations in relation to an ‘empty 
signifier’, we are to suppose that the details of these examples are of no importance to either the form or the content 
of the universal. However, as Butler points out, the very contestation of an empty signifier suggests that more 
attention needs to be paid to particularities, rather than to the relation between the universal and the particular as 
such. What the example adds to content is, therefore, concrete details of the actual contestation of the universal in 
question. My point here is different. It is simply that the content of Laclau’s examples is important because social 
movements have not always existed, ‘the state’ has a very different structure in the postcolonial and metropolitan 
context, ‘capitalism’ is not unchanging and so on. It is because concepts of ‘social movement’, ‘the state’ and 
‘capitalism’ are significantly context-specific that it is important to understand how and why we use them to delineate 
particular social phenomena. This is the task of political sociology that I am arguing for here as a necessary addition 
to post-Marxism.  
 
6 I have given an account of Laclau’s and Mouffe’s post-Marxism that focuses on the Derridean, rather than the 
Lacanian, development of their work. In my view, the theory of hegemony with which I am principally concerned here 
makes use of Derrida and Lacan to very similar ends in showing the limits of representation and its consequences for 
political theory, and I have focused on the former for reasons of space. It seems to me that Laclau’s later ‘Lacanian 
turn’ raises similar problems with regard to an implied but unelaborated political sociology but it is not possible to 
deal with that here.  
 
7 In this respect, Laclau’s normative focus on the ‘political logic’ of equivalence as the only possibility for a left project 
is somewhat limiting, suggesting as it does a totalizing view of progressive politics that, under current social 
conditions, must take the state as its ultimate focus. 
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